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ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: THE PERFECT DEFENSE FOR LAW SCHOOL DECEIT  
By 
Jeremy Alm
* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Since the United States Supreme Court gave the Federal Arbitration Act a robust 
interpretation, arbitration agreements can be found in a variety of consumer contexts.
1
 
Even educational institutions are opting for Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
agreements with students.
2
 Only a few law schools, however, are opting for arbitration 
agreements, even though law schools are increasingly targeted with litigation.
3
 It would 
seem that the uneasy future of some law schools might pose a prime place for arbitration 
agreements to take root.
4
 This article will serve as a warning that future law students 
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1
 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding arbitration agreements should not be “subject 
to any additional limitations under state law”); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) 
(holding “[c]ourts may not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state law applicable only to 
arbitration provisions”); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (expanding the Federal 
Arbitration Act to include employment agreements); see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 
(7th Cir. 1997) (upholding an arbitration agreement in a “shrink wrap contract” that came with consumer’s 
computer purchase); Wash. Mutual Fin. Grp. v. Bailey, 364 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing lower court 
decision that arbitration clause was unconscionable because borrower was illiterate); McKenzie Check 
Advance of Miss. v. Hardy, 866 So. 2d 446, 454-55 (Miss. 2004) (holding that arbitration agreement was 
conscionable in check advance loan contract); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) 
(holding that termite extermination services contract had a valid arbitration clause); Carbajal v. H&R Block 
Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903 (7th Cir. 2004) (upholding adhesion contract’s arbitration clause in tax 
preparation service contract). 
 
2
 See ARGOSY UNIV., INSTITUTIONAL POLICES, ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, available at 
http://catalog.argosy.edu/content.php?catoid=21&navoid=1428#Arbitration_Agreement (last visited Apr. 
7, 2014); DEVRY UNIVERSITY, ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT, available at http://www.high-
school.devry.edu/pdf/Passport2College.pdf. 
 
3
 See also Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law, 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J.2013); Gomez-Jimenez v. 
N.Y. Law Sch., 943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880 
F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (students sued arguing they reasonably relied on faulty employment 
statistics); see generally infra notes 14-27 (discussing lawsuits against law schools and dwindling 
enrollment numbers). Some unaccredited law schools have opted for enrollment agreements with 
arbitration agreements. See CONCORD LAW SCHOOL, CONCORD LAW SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AGREEMENT, 
available at 
http://www.concordlawschool.edu/uploadedFiles/CLS_Concord_Law_School/Concord_Law_School_Doc
uments/CLS%20Enrollment%20Agreement%20Oct%2012_CLICK%282%29.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 
2014). This is not meant to suggest, though, that any law school that opts for an arbitration agreement is 
inherently deceptive in nature. 
 
4
 Compare Gomez-Jimenez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 843, with Harnish, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 654. 
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should be wary of the unfair protections of arbitration clauses.
5
 First, this article will 
illustrate how educational institutions contract regularly with students. Next, this article 
will propose why law schools could be tempted by the protective qualities of arbitration 
agreements. And finally, this article will compare the pros and cons of arbitration 
agreements to further illustrate the detriment such agreement would pose on current and 
prospective law students. 
 
II.   BINDING STUDENTS WITH IMPLIED CONTRACTS  
 Law schools contract with their students all the time. While formal contracts are 
not frequently used, implied contracts are often created when students exchange tuition 
for educational services.
6
 The terms and conditions of the implied contract are then 
established through any publication released by the educational institution, such as 
“catalogs, bulletins, circulars, and institution regulations given to the student.”7 If a law 
school chose to have its students agree to an arbitration agreement, all that would be 
required is for the school to place the clause in a school publication.
8
 In fact, the way 
schools contract with their students is analogous to the often-cited case Hill v. Gateway 
2000, Inc.
9
   
 In Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., the Plaintiffs bought a computer from the 
Defendant without first being given the terms and conditions (which included an 
arbitration agreement).
10
 The terms and conditions were sent with the computer, and the 
Plaintiffs had 30 days to reject the conditions of the purchase by sending the computer 
back for a full refund.
11
 The Court upheld the arbitration agreement because “[c]ustomers 
as a group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic 
recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.”12 In the same light, law 
                                            
5
 See generally infra notes 38-46. 
 
6
 Kashmiri v. Regents, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 635, 650 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2007) (holding “no formal contract 
exists between the University and the professional student subclass, but that an implied contract was 
created by the students' conduct when they accepted the University's offer of enrollment”); see also People 
ex rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll., 14 N.Y.S. 490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.1891), aff'd sub nom. People ex 
rel. Cecil v. Bellevue Hosp. Med. Coll. of N.Y., 128 N.Y. 621, 28 N.E. 253 (N.Y. 1891). 
 
7
 Zumbrun v. Univ. of S. Cal., 101 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1972) (citations omitted). 
 
8
 Like any contract, contractual defenses can be used to invalidate such agreements. See Miler v. Corinthian 
Coll., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (D. Utah 2011) (upholding arbitration agreement as conscionable); 
Brumley v. Commonwealth Bus. Coll. Educ. Corp., 945 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding for-
profit school’s arbitration agreement was not fraudulently induced); Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 
F.Supp.2d 119 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that arbitration agreement was not induced by duress). 
 
9
 Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 
10
 Id. at 1148; see also Montgomery v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 11 C 365, 2011 WL 1118942 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 25, 2011) (citing to Hill, 105 F.3d 1147 in determining that trade school was not required to read the 
arbitration agreement to students). 
 
11
 Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148. 
 
12
 Id. at 1149. 
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schools cannot be required to read the institution’s materials line-by-line to incoming 
students. Instead, students are often given an opportunity to read through the rules and 
regulations of the educational institution. If they do not want to be bound by them, they 
can choose not to attend and receive a tuition refund after a certain amount of time.
13
 
 
III.   THE ARBITRATION TEMPTATION 
 A.  Treacherous Times for Law Schools 
 The turbulent waters law schools are currently navigating could be calmed by 
arbitration agreements. Law student alumni are targeting their alma maters with an 
increasing number of lawsuits; in 2012, fifteen law schools combatted class-action 
lawsuits brought by over 75 graduates.
14
 The lawsuits were based on an assortment of 
claims, but primarily consumer fraud.
15
 The consumer fraud actions were founded on the 
allegedly fraudulent statistics that law schools reported to entice a fresh wave of 1Ls to 
attend.
16
 In essence, law school graduates claimed that the statistics were misleading 
about post-graduate employment opportunities.
17
 To make matters worse, courts sent 
mixed signals regarding the reliability of those statistics.
18
 This means that law schools 
may find themselves warding off consumer fraud actions until the courts have thoroughly 
established the confines of legitimate law school employment reporting practices. And 
while courts wrestle with that notion, the current legal industry illustrates why some law 
schools may choose to push the boundaries of reporting employment data. 
                                            
13
 See HAMLINE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, REGISTRATION, http://law.hamline.edu/registration.html (last viewed 
Apr. 7, 2014) (giving students 10 days from beginning of class to drop without owing tuition or using a 
sliding scale after 10 days); UNIV. OF MINN. SCH. OF LAW, REFUND, DROP/ADD DEADLINES, 
http://www.law.umn.edu/current/deadlines.html (last viewed Apr. 7, 2014). 
 
14
 Vivian Giang, A Bunch of Young Lawyers are Suing Their Law Schools Because They Don’t Have Jobs, 
YAHOO! FINANCE (Feb. 15, 2012, 2:56 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/bunch-young-lawyers-suing-
law-195616601.html. 
 
15
 See Harnish v. Widener Univ. Sch. of Law., 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J.2013) (graduates, including law 
students, suing for inability to find adequate employment); Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. Law Sch., 943 
N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. 2012) (students sued over misrepresented law employment statistics); MacDonald v. 
Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 880 F. Supp. 2d 785 (W.D. Mich. 2012) (students sued arguing they 
reasonably relied on faulty employment statistics). 
 
16
 See, e.g., MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., No. 1:11CV00831, 2011 WL 3486444 at ¶¶ 34-41 
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 10, 2011); Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, No. 37-2011-000091898-CU-FR-
CTL (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.thomasjeffersonclassaction.com/pdf/Complaint-Documents.pdf. 
 
17
 See, e.g., MacDonald, 2011 WL 3486444 at  ¶¶ 34-41; Alaburda, No. 37-2011-000091898-CU-FR-CTL. 
 
18
 Compare Gomez-Jimenez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 843 (holding that students that the statistics are accurate 
enough for students to make an informed decision about attending law school) with Harnish, 931 F. Supp. 
2d 641 (denying law school’s motion to dismiss because law student’s claims were “plausible”). 
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 In June 2007, the legal market hit an all-time high for legal field employment 
opportunities.
19
 But in 2012, the legal market fell by 7.8% from that 2007 high.
20
 The 
legal landscape has discouraged many from even attempting to enter law school.
21
 It is 
reported that the number of LSAT takers from 2012 to 2013 dropped 13%.
22
 Fewer 
LSAT takers equate to fewer applicants to fill seats in the over 200 accredited law 
schools nationwide.
23
 Also, in 2013, the highly regarded U.S. News’ law school rankings 
were rattled after the new scoring method knocked several low ranked schools off the 
list.
24
 Employment placement rates now account for 20% of a law school’s score.25 This 
suggests that if a law school were ever going to tweak its numbers, now would be the 
ideal time in order to maintain its enrollment.  
 Law school employment figures, however, are not the only source of student-
versus-law-school legal actions. Schools are also warding off lawsuits from students who 
are upset over school decisions, such as disciplinary or admissions decisions.
26
 Other 
legal actions focus on more trivial matters, like a broken chair.
27
 Even the most trivial 
                                            
19
 Annie Lowrey, A Case of Supply v. Demand, SLATE (OCT. 27, 2010, 4:14 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2010/10/a_case_of_supply_v_demand.html (last visited 
Apr. 7, 2014). 
 
20
 Id. 
 
21
 Elie Mystal, If Associates Don’t Get a Raise, Expect Even Fewer LSAT Takers, ABOVE THE LAW (Mar. 
14, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/03/if-associates-dont-get-a-raise-expect-even-fewer-lsat-
takers/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 
22
 Id. 
 
23
 Ethan Bronner, Law Schools’ Applications Fall as Costs Rise and Jobs Are Cut, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 
30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/31/education/law-schools-applications-fall-as-costs-rise-and-
jobs-are-cut.html?_r=0 (last visited Apri. 7, 2014); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/in_alphabetical
_order.html (last visited May 14, 2014). 
 
24
 Debra Cassents Weiss, US News Rankings Change With Better Jobs Data; Which Law Schools Are Now 
Unranked?, ABA JOURNAL (Mar. 12, 2013, 7:05 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/new_jobs_data_spurs_changes_in_us_news_rankings_which_law
_schools_are_now_u/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 
25
Some schools that were the center of litigation, like New York Law School, fell off the rankings. Others 
were reported to have fallen 38 places in the latest round of rankings. Id. 
 
26
 See Al-Turk v. Univ. of Neb., No. 8:13CV74, 2013 WL 959223 (D.Neb. 2013); Prete v. Roger Williams 
Univ. Sch. of Law, Civil No. 12–cv–474–JL, 2012 WL 6203083 (D.N.H.2012) (student sued over alleged 
discriminatory practices in early admission decisions); Chan v. Bd. of Regents, Civil Action No. H–12–
0325, 2012 WL 5832494 (S.D.Tex.) (students sued seeking readmission after being expelled for failing to 
meet academic requirements). 
 
27
 The Daily Caller, Law Student Sues School After She Fell Out of A Chair, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 25, 
2003), http://news.yahoo.com/law-student-sues-school-she-fell-chair-123409276.html; see also Staci 
Zaretsky, Another Law School Sued, But This Time With Allegations of ‘Negligent Enrollment’, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Feb. 16, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/another-law-school-sued-but-this-time-
with-allegations-of-negligent-enrollment/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014) (reporting that one law student is suing 
her school for allowing her to enroll when she allegedly was not qualified to attend). 
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suit may take years to reach a conclusion.
28
 Thus, law schools can face a variety of 
ongoing lawsuits, and the use of arbitration agreements could prevent the courts from 
publically meddling in their affairs.
29
 In fact, courts continue to erode the doctrine of 
academic abstention and more readily adjudicate cases they traditionally refused to 
resolve. 
 
 B.  The Destruction of Judicial Abstention in Educational Affairs 
 Historically, the judiciary has hesitantly adjudicated disputes against educational 
institutions.
30
 Experts theorize that the judicial branch’s aversion to adjudicate 
educational institution issues stems from an inability to resolve disputes due to the 
schools’ “polycentric nature.” 31  Universities’ decisions “are products of complex 
interactions” that the judiciary cannot parse through in deciding an outcome.32 Courts 
would also not have access to every necessary party, because the law protects certain 
interests or relationships in the education context.
33
 And in coming to a decision, courts 
would have to speculate the needs of higher education institutions, a task they simply 
could not accurately complete.
34
  
 More recently, the historically hesitant courts are adhering to academic abstention 
in only a small number of cases regarding academic disciplinary and admission 
decisions.
35
 This trend would likely leave courts with broad discretion over false 
advertising and consumer fraud lawsuits against the schools. The dissolution of academic 
                                            
28
 Lucero v. Curators., No. WD 74768, 2013 WL 519460 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (decided in 2013 after 
charges were filed in 2008 stemming from a 2007 charge against the school’s faculty). 
 
29
 See infra section III(c). 
 
30
 See Regents v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (1985) (“[F]ar less is [the federal court] suited to evaluate the 
substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public 
educational institutions-decisions that require ‘an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not 
readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.’” (citation omitted)); 
see also Abdullah v. State, 771 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 2009). 
 
31
 Edward N. Stoner II & J. Michael Showalter, Judicial Deference to Educational Judgment: Justice 
O'Connor's Opinion in Grutter Reapplies Longstanding Principles, as Shown by Rulings Involving College 
Students in the Eighteen Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583, 587 (2004) (citing James 
Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Titles 
II and III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REV. 27, 74 (1996)). 
 
32
 Id. 
 
33
 James Leonard, Judicial Deference to Academic Standards Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
and Titles II and III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 75 NEB. L. REV. 27, 74 (1996). 
 
34
 Supra note 31. 
 
35
 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding a law school’s admission criteria could 
use race as a basis to create a diverse community within the law school and that decision conformed to the 
“tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions . . . .”); Harwood v. Johns 
Hopkins Univ., 747 A.2d 205, 209 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding courts must continue cautiously 
when dealing with university disciplinary actions). 
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abstention may be enough of a threat for law schools to contract arbitration agreements to 
maintain discretion over their affairs. Some proprietary schools have already taken the 
threat to heart.  
 
 C.  Follow the Leader: Proprietary Schools
36
 
 Recently, just like some law schools, proprietary schools have faced litigation due 
to employment statistics reporting.
37
 In the past decade, commentators have targeted 
proprietary schools with harsh criticism. Critics argue that in order to compete with 
traditionally cheaper community colleges, “proprietary schools often must offer 
enrollment at comparable prices, increasing pressure on proprietary schools to maximize 
enrollment numbers and tuition payments.”38  This places pressure on the schools to 
market aggressively and, in doing so, misrepresent employment prospects to potential 
students.
39
 Because of these questionable tactics, for-profit schools are claimed to use 
arbitration agreements as a defensive measure to mitigate the legal and public damages of 
consumer fraud claims.
40
 Additionally, recent case law favoring arbitration agreements 
can be cited as further incentive for proprietary schools’ use of arbitration clauses.  
 Experts argue that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion inhibits judicial review standards of proprietary schools’ fraudulent 
practices.
41
 This notion is hard to disagree with because many favorable court decisions 
for proprietary schools have relied on Concepcion.
42
 The holding in Concepcion is even 
                                            
36
 For the remainder of this article, “proprietary school” will refer to “for-profit colleges and universities 
[that] are managed and governed by private organizations and corporations.” For Profit Colleges and 
Universities, NCSL (July. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/educ/for-profit-colleges-and-
universities.aspx (last visited April 7, 2014) 
 
37
 See In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206, 208 (Tex. 2007) (involving students suing for-
profit school for misrepresenting employment statistics); Marshall v. ITT Technical Inst., No. 3:11–CV–
552, 2012 WL 1565453 (E.D. Tenn. 2012) (student sued proprietary school claiming that institution 
misrepresented employment prospects). 
 
38
 Patrick F. Linehan, Dreams Protected: A New Approach to Policing Proprietary Schools' 
Misrepresentations, 89 GEO. L.J. 753, 757 (2001). 
 
39
 Id. at 759 (citing Delta Sch. of Com., Inc. v. Wood, 766 S.W.2d 424 (Ark. 1989) (holding that school 
induced students to enroll based on false promises of salary and employment opportunities)). Additionally, 
disturbing statistics from 1992-1997 show fraudulent misrepresentations and deceptive marketing practices 
forced closures or removed federal loan eligibility from nearly 800 for-profit trade schools. Id. at 760 
(citing Charles R. Babcock, Loan Abuses by Some Trade Schools Leave Taxpayers with Big Bill, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 29, 1997, at A1). 
 
40
 See Amanda Harmon Cooley, The Need For Legal Reform Of The For-Profit Educational Industry, 79 
TENN. L. REV. 515, 538-40 (2012). 
 
41
 Charles Pollack, An American Crisis: Proprietary Schools and National Student Debt, 1 Am. U. Bus. L. 
Rev. 137, 157-60 (2012). It is necessary to note that in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion the Supreme 
Court upheld an arbitration clause in a cellphone contract requiring arbitration for any legal disputes and 
disallowing class actions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748-54 (2011). 
 
 423 
 
being marked as a “serious blow to consumer class actions and likely foreclos[ing] the 
possibility of any recovery for many wronged individuals” as courts rule in favor of for-
profit institutions.
43
 
 Although, it is not only Concepcion’s holding that is establishing legal hurdles for 
student consumers. Additional precedent has established a defensive shield, allowing 
arbitration agreements to protect academic institutions from the ramifications of their 
allegedly fraudulent behavior.
44
 The secretive nature of arbitration proceedings will not 
alert the public of any deceptive behavior. In fact, experts cite to the publicity of recent 
multi-million dollar settlements in proprietary school litigation as the motivation for other 
for-profit schools to stonewall class action lawsuits via arbitration agreements.
45
 Thus, 
proprietary schools have laid the foundation for law schools to securely implement 
arbitration agreements and defraud aspiring lawyers if they so choose, so long as the 
arbitration agreements are conscionable.
46
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
42
 See Affiliated Computer Serv., Inc. v. Fensterstock, 611 F.3d 124, cert granted, (U.S. Jun. 13, 2011) (No. 
10-987)  (remanding case back to US Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Concepcion); 
Marshall, 2012 WL 1565453 (granting proprietary schools’ motion to dismiss based on principals in 
Concepcion); Mitchell v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 4:11cv1581 TCM, 2011 WL 6009658 (E.D. Mo. 2011) 
(granting motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of unconscionability of arbitration agreement with for-profit 
school). It is also necessary to note that Concepcion has been greatly cited in cases warding off class 
actions in other consumer contract contexts. See David Segal, A Rising Tide Against Class-Action Suits, N. 
Y. TIMES, May 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/your-money/class-actions-face-hurdle-in-
2011-supreme-court-ruling.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
 
43
 Bernal v. Burnett, 793 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1288 (D. Colo. 2011). In Bernal v. Burnett, students brought a 
class action against a trade school alleging misrepresentation of attendance costs, likelihood of job 
placement, and salary expectations upon graduation. Id. at 1282. However, prior to participating in classes, 
students signed an arbitration agreement. Id. at 1282-84. The court held the agreement could only be 
invalidated if the arbitration clause was found to be unconscionable and ultimately saw Concepcion 
creating “broad enough implications that it constitutes an intervening change in the applicable legal 
context.” Id. at 1285. 
 
44
See, e.g., Bernal, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1287-88 (compelling arbitration despite court being “sympathetic” 
towards Plaintiffs); Marshall, 2012 WL 1565453, at *5 (holding arbitration valid in dispute over 
misrepresented employment statistics). 
 
45
 One proprietary school settled a lawsuit after cutting a check for $40 million and offering up to $20,000 
refunds to some 8,500 students. Supra note 40, at 539 (citing Terence Chea, Culinary School Grads Claim 
They Were Ripped Off, MSNBC.COM (Sept. 4, 2011, 5:35 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/06/culinary-school-grads-ripped-off_n_950107.html). The 
culinary school later claimed that the case was too expensive to litigate. Id. 
 
46
 Bernal, 793 F.Supp.2d at 1287; see also Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 876 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding arbitration provision was conscionable because it was not hidden in the student contract); Brumley 
v. Commonwealth Bus. Coll. Educ. Corp., 945 N.E.2d 770 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that arbitration 
agreement was conscionable despite students claiming they were not allowed to read the contract before 
agreeing to it). 
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IV.   THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY TRUTH OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN LAW 
SCHOOLS 
 
 A.  Arguments for Arbitration: Applying Education-Based Arguments 
 In general, arbitration is considered to be an amicable solution for students and 
their academic institutions, because it promises a fair and affordable solution compared to 
students’ current outlets for grievances.47 
 Traditionally, students who disagree with academic institutions’ administration 
decisions have only two solutions: school committees or the court system.
48
 However, it 
is suggested that a school committee can reflect an unfair tribunal to students, mainly 
because committees are often made up of a panel of school officials.
49
 Furthermore, 
critics of committee reviews cite that members who make the determinations often lack 
experience or knowledge in dispute resolution techniques.
50
 These same panel members 
also must continue to work with faculty members who were part of the dispute, making 
neutrality an even more difficult task.
51
 Higher-education institutions also often lack 
procedures or guidelines for the committee members to guide their decision, adding 
“confusion and uncertainty to the inherent unpleasantries of such decision-making.”52 A 
student can sometimes appeal the decision if it is not deemed final, but only to a different 
panel of school administrators.
53
 Alternatively to school committees, the student could 
chance judicial review, but that may lead to the dead-end of judicial abstention, as 
discussed above.
54
 Regardless, judicial intervention is costly for both students and their 
respective institutions.
55
 Thus, if arbitration is selected as the method of dispute 
resolution instead of these two traditional procedures, it could prove to be a useful tool to 
traverse the complex disputes of educational institutions.
56
   
                                            
47
 See generally Donna Biaklik et al., Higher Education: Fertile Ground for ADR, 49-Mar DISP. RESOL. J. 
61 (1994). The author believes many of the arguments for arbitrating educational disputes can be applied 
universally and, in this case, to law schools. 
 
48
 Id. at 61-62; see also Academic Policy Manuel, Academic Standards Policies, Academic Performance 
and Grading, Grade Changes, ST. THOMAS SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.stthomas.edu/law/academics/ 
academicpolicymanual/academicstandardspolicies/academicperformanceandgrading/gradechanges/ (last 
visited March 31, 2014) (requiring Grade Appeal Committee to determine grade disputes). 
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62. 
 
51
 Id.  
 
52
 Id. 
 
53
 Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62.  
 
54
 Id. 
 
55
 Biaklik et al., supra note 47, at 62. 
 
56
 See id. at 64.  
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 Since academic disputes can be intricate, retired professors or academic 
administrators from nearby institutions trained in ADR techniques could be selected to 
arbitrate.
57
  Selected arbitrators would mitigate any unfair perceptions that may be 
inherent with school committees.
58
 Furthermore, the transparency of arbitration clauses 
could establish procedures and time limits for students to follow, allowing for a more 
predictable process for students.
59
 In allowing student claims to be arbitrated, two 
benefits would result.  
 First, the doctrine of academic abstention would be revived because arbitration 
agreements would, once again, solidify the historical deference of academic issues by the 
judicial branch.
60
 Secondly, while not referenced in academic settings specifically, 
arbitration clauses are held to preserve reputations when matters “could have a significant 
impact on a disputant's reputation.” 61  With research suggesting that an educational 
institution’s reputation is key for attracting new students, it is understandable why a law 
school could benefit from an arbitration agreement.
62
 While persuasive, the forgoing 
reasons fail to take into account many inherent problems with using arbitration 
agreements.  
 
 B.  Arguments Against Arbitrating: Applying Consumer Protection Arguments 
 At its most diluted form, investing in education is a consumer transaction.
63
 For 
law students, it is an expensive transaction, no matter where a student opts to attend; the 
average tuition cost for a private school is $40,585 a year, and $23,590 a year for in-state 
students at a public institution.
64
 In consumer situations, opponents of arbitration 
agreements believe that arbitration is not an alternate dispute resolution, but rather a 
modification of the substantive rights of consumers.
65
 In other words, 
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“consumer arbitration is often simply a way for a business to reduce the number of 
disputes, avoid the courts and juries, and achieve more favorable results”: a notion 
backed by empirical studies.
66
  
 In some studies, arbitration agreements are cited as an easy way for businesses to 
maneuver around unfavorable laws.
67
 Even if the law is substantially unfair to businesses, 
courts may never have the opportunity to overturn precedent if disputes avoid judicial 
review altogether.
68
 But it seems that businesses will not risk facing financial damages in 
hopes of changing the law, especially when arbitration offers favorable results.
69
 
Additionally, arbitrators are not bound by the rules of the courts, which does not allow a 
consumer to adequately predict outcomes.
70
 Adding to the unpredictability, arbitrators are 
not required to write reasons for their decisions nor publish them.
71
 Therefore, unlike the 
judiciary bound by the doctrines of stare decisis, arbitrators can often secretly make 
binding decisions regardless of what has happened in the past.
72
 It would seem that 
arbitration agreements would surreptitiously protect a law school’s reputation and 
finances, while substantially leaving current and prospective law students in the lurch. 
 
 C.  Arbitration Agreements: The Cons Outweigh the Pros 
 The “pros” and “cons” of applying arbitration to law schools suggest that 
arbitration can serve either a beneficial or destructive function. However, since the bulk 
of disputes focus around law schools’ employment reporting practices, arbitration 
                                            
66
 Id. at 154. 
 
67
 See Alderman, supra note 65, at 154 (citing W. Scott Simpson et al., The Source of Alabama's 
Abundance of Arbitration Cases: Alabama's Bizarre Law of Damages for Mental Anguish, 28 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 135 (2004) (finding that Alabama auto dealers, fearing substantial judgments against them from 
the current laws, enacted arbitration agreements to maneuver around the laws)). 
 
68
 Id.  
 
69
 A recent analysis of the credit card industry found the incentives surprisingly one-sided. Using available 
information, the Public Citizen found that the most-hired arbitrators awarded in favor of consumers 1.6 to 
24.7 percent of the time and suggest the appeal of repeat business for arbitrators’ apparent bias. John 
O’Donnell, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 16 (PUBLIC 
CITIZEN 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.  The study cited to the 
financial incentives of repeat corporate business for the blatant biases. See id. Furthermore, the study found 
that, in some cases, cavalier arbitrators made up their own rules to the detriment of the consumer. Id. at 9 
(finding that arbitrators gave automatic deadline extensions to corporate defendants that did not ask for 
them).  Contra Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer 
Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 845-6 (2010) (“Consumers won some relief in 53.3% of 
the cases they filed and recovered an average of $19,255; business claimants won some relief in 83.6% of 
their cases and recovered an average of $20,648.”). 
 
70
 Alderman, supra note 65, at 151 (citing Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet 
Revolution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 763 (2002)). 
 
71
 Id. at 155.  
 
72
 Id. 
 
 427 
 
agreements would cripple current and prospective law students’ rights as consumers.73 
Law schools could arguably hide behind arbitration agreements, like some proprietary 
schools reportedly do, and thus protect a crucial element of gaining new students: their 
reputations.
74
  
 Arbitrators’ awards are kept secret and would add to a possibly endless cycle of 
disputes.
75
 For example, if a law student were to win an arbitrated dispute for 
misrepresentation, the award’s secrecy would prevent other students from falling into the 
same deceptive trap (assuming one exists). The law school’s reputation would remain 
publically untarnished and continue to attract aspiring lawyers.
76
 This is arguably 
evidenced by the fact that proprietary schools remain a multi-million dollar business, 
drawing in an increasing number of students.
77
 The accuracy of some proprietary 
schools’ employment numbers are uncertain until either a student defensively voids the 
arbitration provision or an arbitrator’s decision is made public.78 Similarly, if law schools 
were to establish arbitration agreements, law students could not adequately protect 
themselves. But even if the awards were made public, there is still the possibility of bias. 
 The area of arbitration is relatively hazy when it comes to the utility of arbitration 
as an alternative dispute method.
79
 Studies of the credit card industry point to inherent 
arbitrator biases.
80
 There is little to suggest that arbitrators would not carry biases into a 
dispute between a law school and its students.
81
 In fact, the legal community is often 
cited as a tight-knit community where reputation is everything.
82
 Some of those 
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communal ties go back to law schools and an arbitrator’s alma mater.83 In an effort to not 
destroy those ties, it can be suggested that an arbitrator may favor his alma mater or legal 
tie in making a decision. Even ADR experts suggest that co-workers will favor one 
another in dispute resolution settings. 
84
  
 
V.   Conclusion 
 Arbitration is a useful tool, but only if the tool matches the job. For law schools, 
there are many temptations to bind potential and current students to arbitrate disputes. 
However, arbitration agreements could hide a law school’s potentially deceptive practices 
from current or prospective students. The damage this would cause to a student marks the 
necessity for preventing all laws schools from imposing arbitration agreements at all. 
Nevertheless, law schools are currently free to use arbitration agreements until there is 
successful legislative intervention.
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